Abstract. On the orthodox view in economics, interpersonal comparisons of utility are not empirically meaningful, and "hence" impossible. To reassess this view, this paper draws on the parallels between the problem of interpersonal comparisons of utility and the problem of translation of linguistic meaning, as explored by Quine. I discuss several cases of what the empirical evidence for interpersonal comparisons of utility might be and show that, even on the strongest of these, interpersonal comparisons are empirically underdetermined and, if we also deny any appropriate truth of the matter, indeterminate. However, the underdetermination can be broken non-arbitrarily (though not purely empirically) if (i) we assign normative significance to certain states of affairs or (ii) we posit a fixed connection between certain empirically observable proxies and utility. I conclude that, even if interpersonal comparisons are not empirically meaningful, they are not in principle impossible.
Introduction
This paper is concerned with our basis for making interpersonal comparisons of utility. Utility can be, and has been, interpreted in many different ways. The present argument applies to any conception of utility that has the following properties: (i) utility captures some form of welfare;
(ii) utility is something that we attribute to a person; (iii) utility can be experienced (if at all) only from a first-person perspective; and (iv) utility may surface observably in the form of a person's choice behaviour and/or other observable proxies.
1
Examples of interpersonal comparisons of utility are statements of the forms "Person i's utility in state x is at least as great as person j's utility in state y" (an interpersonal comparison of utility levels) or "If we switch from state x to state y, the ratio of person i's utility gain/loss to person j's utility gain/loss is λ", where λ is some real number (an interpersonal comparison of utility units). Below a third type of interpersonal comparison will be added (a utility comparison with respect to an interpersonally significant zero-line).
1 Although this characterization of utility is deliberately left relatively open, so as to apply to a class of conceptions of utility, not all conceptions of utility fall into it. Even amongst those conceptions of utility satisfying (i), there is a great range of diversity. Elster and Roemer (1991, introduction) identify two dimensions that characterize different conceptions of utility (they actually address "well-being") that may lend themselves to interpersonal comparisons. On one dimension (call it the subjective-objective dimension), conceptions are divided into (a) subjective mental states (hedonic satisfaction), (b) degree of objective satisfaction of subjective desires, and (c) objective states. On a second dimension (call it the relevance-irrelevance dimension), conceptions are characterized by the criteria by which states of pleasure or desire-satisfaction are admitted or rejected as admissible components of utility. The present argument aims to be neutral with regard to the second dimension. With regard to the first, however, the present argument applies only to conceptions of type (a), as only those have properties (ii), (iii) and (iv).
In everyday life we often make (what look like) interpersonal comparisons of utility. We attribute certain utility levels or utility gains or losses to people and compare these across different people. Interpersonal comparisons play an important role in many choice situations, especially when several people are affected by a decision. We make choices to switch from x (e.g. "cooking Marmite paté") to y (e.g. "cooking Chocolate crépes") on the basis of whether we believe this switch incurs an immense utility gain for person i (e.g. "someone socialized in a Marmite-free part of the world and who finds Marmite revolting") that far exceeds a concurrent very moderate utility loss for person j (e.g. "a British Marmite connoisseur"). What exactly is captured by such attributions of utility is far from clear.
The orthodox view in economics is that interpersonal comparisons of utility are not empirically meaningful. Robbins (1932) contribution to social choice theory is premised on the view "that interpersonal comparison of utilities has no meaning and, in fact, that there is no meaning relevant to welfare comparisons in the measurability of individual utility" (Arrow, 1951 (Arrow, /1963 . Although the discrepancy between this view and the ease with which we make (what look like) interpersonal comparisons in everyday life has been a continuing source of philosophical puzzlement, the orthodox view (or more refined versions of it) is strikingly persistent. Recently, Hausman (1995) , for instance, argued that interpersonal comparisons of utility are impossible unless utility is interpreted as preference satisfaction.
2
These arguments raise at least two different questions, which are sometimes confused with each other. First, are interpersonal comparisons of utility empirically meaningful, which we will take to mean: are they determined, in a relevant sense (spelled out below), by empirical evidence? Second, are interpersonal comparisons of utility possible? In particular, if they are not empirically meaningful in the sense of being determined by empirical evidence, are they meaningful in some other relevant sense (also spelled out below)?
It is often assumed that a negative answer to the first question (as given by the orthodox view on interpersonal comparisons) entails a negative answer to the second; in short, if interpersonal comparisons of utility are not determined by empirical evidence, then they are impossible. Such impossibility conclusions cannot be ignored. The question of whether or not 2 If utility is interpreted as preference satisfaction, on Hausman's account, identifying the level of satisfaction for each person's top preference with 1 and for each person's bottom preference with 0 is warranted. Arguably, the conception of utility as preference satisfaction is a conception of type (b) on the subjective-objective dimension introduced in note 1 above. Hausman also holds that the interpretation of utility as preference satisfaction does not provide the kind of morally relevant notion of utility that is required by utilitarian welfare economics. interpersonal comparisons of utility are possible has far-reaching implications for utilitarian theories of justice and for welfare economics.
Arrow's impossibility theorem (1951/1963) confirms that interpersonal comparisons of utility are relevant to whether or not certain collective decision problems can be solved: Arrow's theorem shows that, if the effects of outcomes on persons are specified in terms of (ordinal) utility (or some other evaluation standard) without interpersonal comparability, there exists no procedure for aggregating such individual utility information into collective preference orderings, where the procedure satisfies some minimal conditions (stated below). If the effects of outcomes on persons are specified in terms of interpersonally comparable utility (or some other interpersonally comparable evaluation standard), Arrow's theorem no longer applies, and there are aggregation procedures satisfying Arrow's minimal conditions (see, amongst many others, Sen, 1970 , d'Aspremont, 1985 .
3 These results will be briefly reviewed in section 4.
This paper aims to reassess the status of interpersonal comparisons of utility. The paper draws on the parallels between the problem of interpersonal comparisons of utility and the problem of translation of linguistic meaning, as explored by Quine (1960 Quine ( , 1970 . 4 According to
Quine's indeterminacy of translation thesis (discussed in more detail below), there exist rival schemes of attributing meanings to speakers, where the different schemes are mutually incompatible, and yet equally empirically adequate. Crucially, however, indeterminacy of translation does not imply impossibility of translation. The underdetermination between different schemes of attributing meanings to speakers is broken non-arbitrarily by long-standing linguistic conventions.
I argue that we can reconcile the main insight underlying the orthodox view on interpersonal comparisons of utility -namely that such comparisons are empirically underdetermined -with an account of how interpersonal comparisons are nonetheless possible.
Suppose we have a situation of empirical underdetermination between different schemes of attributing utilities to persons, where the different schemes yield mutually incompatible interpersonal comparisons, and yet each scheme is equally empirically adequate. I suggest that this underdetermination can be broken non-arbitrarily in a way that is similar to how the 3 To pursue this escape-route from Arrow's impossibility theorem successfully we must either defend interpersonal comparisons of utility, or settle for a welfare-relevant evaluation standard different from utility that is interpersonally comparable, such as an index of Rawlsian primary goods or a suitable index of Sen's functionings and capabilities. The question of whether interpersonal comparisons are meaningful in a given sense depends on what evaluation standard we choose to compare: interpersonal comparisons of monetary income are unproblematic (leaving practical issues aside), but maybe not morally relevant, and interpersonal comparisons of the amount of health care or education a person has access to are also unproblematic (again leaving practical issues aside), and maybe more morally relevant in certain contexts. This paper, however, is not committed to any specific view on the question of which evaluation standards are morally relevant and why this is so. 4 Davidson (1974 4 Davidson ( , 1986 hinted at these parallels without developing them in detail.
underdetermination between different rival attributions of meanings to speakers is broken nonarbitrarily.
The realization that underdetermination, or even indeterminacy, does not imply impossibility then tames the problem of interpersonal comparisons of utility. The main insight underlying the orthodox view on interpersonal utility comparisons -namely that such comparisons are empirically underdetermined -remains correct, but its implications are far less negative than commonly assumed. A negative answer to the first of the two questions raised above (are interpersonal comparisons of utility empirically meaningful?) does not force us into a negative answer to the second one (are interpersonal comparisons of utility possible?).
Underdetermination and Indeterminacy
To define underdetermination and indeterminacy, I will follow the traditional syntactic approach to theories. Both a theory and a set of empirical observations will be represented as a set of sentences of a formal language. Given a set of (empirical) observation sentences Φ, a theory T is adequate with respect to Φ if T implies all the sentences in Φ. In other words, a theory is adequate with respect to a given set of observation sentences if these observation sentences are amongst the ones the theory would have led us to expect, i.e. if they are amongst the implications of the theory. Thus the basic logical relation between theory and empirical observations is a relation of one-way implication. A theory, if it is adequate, implies the observation sentences, but the observation sentences do not in general imply the theory. A theory T (or a specific theoretical statement τ) is determined by a set of observation sentences Φ if Φ implies T (or τ). A theory T (or a specific theoretical statement τ) is underdetermined by Φ if T (or τ) is consistent with, but not determined by, Φ. If T (or τ) is underdetermined by Φ, then there exists an alternative theory T' (or an alternative theoretical statement τ') such that T' (or τ') is also consistent with Φ, but T and T' (τ and τ') are mutually inconsistent (see also List, 1999) .
Underdetermination, thus, is a purely logical concept. Indeterminacy, by contrast, is a metaphysical concept stronger than underdetermination. Given a set of alternative theories and a set of observation sentences Φ, we have a situation of indeterminacy if each of the given alternative theories is underdetermined by Φ and there exists no independent fact of the matter as to which of the alternative theories is the 'true' or 'correct' one (for a more detailed account of the relation between underdetermination, indeterminacy and facts of the matter, see Gibson, 1986 We will add to these two familiar types of interpersonal comparisons a third, less familiar one (List, 2001 'Aspremont, 1985) . 9 7 A positive monotonic transformation is a function φ : R → R with the property that, for any s, t∈R, s<t implies φ(s)< φ(t). A positive affine transformation is a function φ : R → R with the property that there exist a, b∈R (b>0)
such that, for all t∈R, φ(t) = a + bt. A positive linear transformation is a function φ : R → R with the property that there exists b∈R (b>0) such that, for all t∈R, φ(t) = bt. A sign-preserving transformation is a function φ : R → R with the property that, for all t∈R, sign(φ(t)) = sign(t). 8 Informational equivalence is an equivalence relation (a reflexive, symmetric and transitive binary relation) on the set of all possible profiles of utility functions. There are different ways of defining informational equivalence, as detailed in table 1, where each such definition corresponds to a different way of partitioning the set of all possible profiles of utility functions into disjoint equivalence classes. Once the equivalence relation of informational equivalence has been defined, this definition then induces a corresponding definition of the informational content of a given profile of utility functions. Specifically, whenever two profiles fall into the same equivalence class with respect to informational equivalence, they are taken to have the same informational content. This means that only information shared by all profiles within the same equivalence class (i.e. statements true of all profiles within the same equivalence class) can be considered meaningful. 9 Table 1 focuses on the implications of the choice of a specific class of transformation for the question of whether (UC)-, (LC)-or (ZC)-statements are invariant under these transformations (and thus "meaningful"). For a more detailed discussion of the logical relation between meaningful statements and classes of admissible transformations, see Bossert and Weymark (1996, section 5) .
Condition:
The profiles {u i } i∈N and {u* i } i∈N are informationally equivalent if ... 
Table 1
In section 4, I will briefly review the implications of interpersonal comparability of utility for Arrow's impossibility theorem (for a detailed discussion of Arrow's theorem and the implications of interpersonal comparability of utility, see Bossert and Weymark, 1996) . The main argument of the paper can still be followed if section 4 is skipped.
Interpersonal Comparisons and Arrow's Impossibility Theorem
A social welfare functional (SWFL) is a function F that maps each profile {u i } i∈N in a given domain to a collective preference ordering R on the set X, where R is reflexive, connected and transitive. xRy is interpreted to mean "x is collectively at least as good as y". R induces a strong ordering on X, defined as follows: for all x, y∈X, xPy if and only if xRy and not yRx. Moreover, it is required that F should map informationally equivalent profiles to the same collective preference ordering, formally we have:
INVARIANCE ASSUMPTION (INV).
For any {u i } i∈N and {u* i } i∈N in the domain of F, if {u i } i∈N and {u* i } i∈N are informationally equivalent, then F({u i } i∈N ) = F({u* i } i∈N ).
The invariance assumption must always be stated with respect to a specific definition of informational equivalence, as given by the measurability and interpersonal comparability assumptions in table 1. The problem addressed by Arrow's theorem is whether there exist SWFLs, F, that satisfy some minimal conditions. Arrow's conditions are the following:
UNIVERSAL DOMAIN (U).
The domain of F is the set of all logically possible profiles of utility functions.
Condition (U) requires that any logically possible profile of utility functions be admissible as input to the aggregation.
WEAK PARETO PRINCIPLE (P).
Let {u i } i∈N be any profile in the domain of F, and let R = F({u i } i∈N ). For any x 1 , x 2 ∈X, we have x 1 Px 2 whenever, for all i∈N, u i (x 1 )>u i (x 2 ).
Condition (P) requires that, if all individuals have a greater utility under x 1 than under x 2 , then x 1 should be collectively preferred to x 2 .
INDEPENDENCE OF IRRELEVANT ALTERNATIVES (I).
Let {u i } i∈N and {u* i } i∈N be any profiles in the domain of F, and let R = F({u i } i∈N ) and R* = F({u* i } i∈N ). For any x 1 , x 2 ∈X, if, for all i∈N,
Condition (I) requires that the collective ranking of any pair of alternatives should depend exclusively on the values of the individual utility functions for that pair of alternatives.
NON-DICTATORSHIP (D)
. F is not dictatorial: there does not exist an i∈N such that, for all {u i } i∈N in the domain of F and any
Condition (D) requires that there should not exist one individual, a dictator, whose utility function always (except possibly in cases of indifference) determines the collective preference.
Arrow's impossibility theorem states that, given (ONC), there exists no SWFL satisfying these four conditions simultaneously (Arrow, 1951 (Arrow, /1963 Sen 1970 Sen /1979 
.
It is also known that, for suitable other measurability and interpersonal comparability conditions, there exist SWFLs satisfying (U), (P), (I) and (D). Table 2 shows the logical implications of the conditions listed in table 1 for the existence or non-existence of SWFLs satisfying Arrow's minimal conditions (see Sen, 1970 , d'Aspremont, 1985 and List, 2001 , on the condition (ONC+0)). invariant under the class of transformations up to which a profile of utility functions is unique.
Viewed in this light, the meaningfulness of interpersonal comparisons of utility is a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of aggregation procedures satisfying all of Arrow's minimal conditions simultaneously.
The Parallel between Translation of Meaning and Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility
To identify a parallel between the problem of interpersonal comparisons of utility and the problem of translation of meaning, as explored by Quine (1960) , it is useful to recall the characterization of utility given in section 1 and to compare it with Quine's conception of meaning. 10 Utility and meaning differ with respect to property (i): utility does, whereas meaning does not, capture some form of welfare. But with respect to property (ii), both utility and meaning are something we attribute to a person. With respect to property (iii), both utility and meaning are 10 The present argument does not depend on the defensibility of Quine's theory of language and its underlying assumptions. Much of modern linguistics has departed from Quine's account (e.g. Chomsky, 1969) . Rather, given the parallels between the structure of Quine's conception of meaning and the structure of the conceptions of utility addressed here, the present argument seeks to draw on Quine's insights on what the implications of this structure are. This is independent from the question of whether an account of language or utility based on this structure is defensible.
something that can be experienced (if at all) only from a first-person perspective, although Quine himself, as a behaviourist, might be reluctant to speak of experiencing meaning. 11 Finally, with regard to property (iv), both utility and meaning surface observably in the form of certain behavioural and/or other observable proxies.
Translation involves attributing linguistic meanings to different speakers (property (ii)).
Suppose I observe that a speaker of a different language assents to the observation sentence "Gavagai!" in precisely the same empirical conditions in which I assent to the English observation sentence "Rabbit!". Or suppose I observe that another speaker of English assents to the sentence "Rabbit!" in precisely the same empirical conditions in which I assent to this sentence. Then I am inclined to infer that the sentences "Gavagai!" for the foreign language speaker, "Rabbit!" for the other English speaker, and "Rabbit!" for me all have the same meaning.
On Quine's account, our sole basis for making such judgments of interpersonal sameness of meaning lies in our empirical observations of people's linguistic behaviour (property (iv)), since
we have no introspective first-person access to other persons' minds (property (iii)). According to
Quine's indeterminacy of translation thesis, even the totality of empirical evidence about a person's linguistic behaviour underdetermines the attribution of meanings to that person. Given suitable adjustments in the translation of other sentences, the rival hypotheses that "Gavagai!" for the foreign language speaker (or "Rabbit!" for the other English speaker) means "Undetached rabbit part!" or "Temporal rabbit stage!" rather than "Rabbit!" are equally compatible with our empirical observations of the foreign speaker's (or the other English speaker's) linguistic behaviour. Which translation of "Gavagai!" we adopt has potentially far-reaching repercussions for the translation of more theoretical sentences. 12 Although the non-standard translations seem less parsimonious from the perspective of our own English language, there is, on Quine's account, not even in principle any evidence that would break the underdetermination between different such rival translations. And since Quine holds that positing in principle inaccessible facts of the 11 It should be emphasized that Quine's position is quite radical. While the orthodox account of utility denies the existence of direct third-person access to a subject's utilities, the account still assumes that the subject him-or herself has first-person access to his or her own utilities. Quine's position, in its radical form, is not only that there is no direct third-person access to what a speaker means, but also that not even the speaker him-or herself has first-person access to his or her own meanings. 12 Strictly speaking (and as Quine himself points out), the "Gavagai!"-example by itself illustrates only indeterminacy of reference, not indeterminacy of translation. Indeterminacy of translation requires that there exist sentences which can be adequately translated not only in two or more different ways (like the sentence "Gavagai!"), but also in logically incompatible ways (unlike the sentence "Gavagai!", whose rival translations are different, but not logically incompatible -in Quine's terms, they are holophrastically equivalent). The arguments of the present paper, however, are not dependent on the indeterminacy of translation thesis. The present analysis of the problem of interpersonal comparisons of utility can equally be developed on the basis of a parallel between the problem of attributing utility and the problem of attributing reference.
matter is methodologically unacceptable, he concludes that translation and, more generally, judgments of interpersonal sameness of meaning are indeterminate.
Similarly, the utilities experienced by another person are not directly observable by us (property (iii)). We can only observe the behaviour of the person (property (iv)), including their choice behaviour and their verbal expressions, and possibly other physiological proxies for utility. These proxies might range from the person's facial expressions on the folk-psychological side to a measurement of their neural activity on the high-tech-psychological side. Like the attribution of meanings to a speaker on the basis of the speaker's linguistic behaviour, the attribution of utility to a person (property (ii)) involves theorizing on the basis of whatever evidence about this person is accessible from an external third-person perspective. Therefore, in making interpersonal comparisons of utility, we must rely on whatever attribution of utilities to the relevant persons most adequately covers the available empirical evidence, given certain background assumptions about how utility surfaces in observable ways. On the orthodox account, even the totality of such evidence underdetermines interpersonal comparisons of utility: "The susceptibility of one mind may, for what we know, be a thousand times greater than that of another. But, provided that the susceptibility was different in a like ratio in all directions, we should never be able to discover the difference. Every mind is thus inscrutable to every other mind, and no common denominator of feeling seems to be possible ... the motive in one mind is weighed only against other motives in the same mind, never against the motives in other minds" (Jevons, 1911, p. 14) . As in the case of translation, if all relevant observable behaviour and, possibly, other relevant observable physiological responses of two persons are identical, then we are inclined to attribute identical utilities to these persons. Call this the standard hypothesis. But consider the rival hypothesis that one of the two persons, the 'utility monster', is one thousand times more susceptible to pleasure and pain than the other. If Jevons's argument is correct, this rival hypothesis, while apparently less parsimonious than the standard hypothesis, is equally compatible with all available empirical evidence. If we believe that Jevons's argument is correct and that we have not left out any relevant empirical evidence, we are forced to conclude that interpersonal comparisons of utility are underdetermined by the totality of empirical evidence. If we believe in addition that there is no independent fact of the matter to break the underdetermination, we are forced to conclude that interpersonal comparisons of utility are indeterminate.
Such, in short, is the parallel between the problem of translation of meaning and the problem of interpersonal comparisons of utility. I will now turn to a more detailed discussion of the latter.
Attributing Utility to Persons on the Basis of Empirical Evidence
As noted, the utilities experienced by the persons in N under the options in X cannot be directly observed. Like the attribution of meanings to a set of speakers, the attribution of utilities to a set of persons involves building a theory on the basis of the available evidence. This theory consists of a profile of utility functions {u i } i∈N and some auxiliary assumptions about how utility surfaces in observable ways. A typical, but not uncontroversial, such assumption is that, if u i (x)>u i (y), then person i would, in normal circumstances, choose x over y. It is only after attributing a profile of utility functions to the persons in N and specifying relevant auxiliary assumptions that we can make interpersonal comparisons of utility. Thus making such comparisons is a two-step process.
In a first step, we attribute to the persons in N a profile of utility functions {u i } i∈N such that {u i } i∈N (jointly with the relevant auxiliary assumptions) is adequate with respect to the available evidence. In a second step, we use the attributed profile of utility functions to make interpersonal comparisons of utility. Table 3 13 The two-step model is an idealization. The main aim of that model is to emphasize that making interpersonal comparisons involves the attribution of a profile of utility functions to the set of persons. As an anonymous reviewer has pointed out, in real life, the two-step process may not always take place in the way suggested by the model; in particular, the direction of the two-step process may sometimes even be reversed: our attribution of a profile of utility functions to a set of persons may sometimes be informed by the interpersonal comparisons we are inclined to make, not the other way round. For example, we may sometimes attribute intense preferences to a person not on the basis of this person's choices, but because we have found such intense preferences in others (as judged by their choices) and because we assume different persons to be similar in their psychology.
empirical evidence about the persons in N: -choice behaviour -other observable proxies for utility theory: -a profile of utility functions for N,{u i } i∈N -auxiliary assumptions about how {u i } i∈N surfaces in observable ways interpersonal comparisons:
The relation between box 2 and box 3 is one of logical implication: Given a profile of utility functions, we can make (LC)-, (UC)-and (ZC)-statements relative to that profile. This means that, if we can be sure that we have filled box 2 'correctly', i.e. that we have found the 'correct' profile of utility functions, we will have found a basis for interpersonal comparisons. Or, to be more precise, we will have found such a basis if we can be sure that the content of box 2 is unique up to a sufficiently small class of transformations for (LC)-, (UC)-or (ZC)-statements to be invariant under these transformations. The central question we have to address is therefore whether the empirical evidence in box 1 determines the theory in box 2 sufficiently uniquely.
The onus of argument on the proponent of the empirical meaningfulness of interpersonal comparisons of utility is to show that the empirical evidence in box 1 determines a profile of utility functions in box 2 uniquely up to a sufficiently small class of transformations. The onus of argument on the proponent of the possibility of interpersonal comparisons of utility is slightly weaker: it is to show that, even if there is no straightforward relation of logical implication leading from box 1 to box 2, there are other, possibly non-empirical, considerations over and above the evidence in box 1 which enable us to select a profile of utility functions in box 2 uniquely up to a sufficiently small class of transformations.
The rest of section 6 is mainly concerned with the former question about empirical meaningfulness, section 7 mainly with the latter one about possibility. In subsection 6.1, I will introduce several different cases of what the relevant empirical evidence might be. In subsection 6.2, I will then explore the implications of the various cases.
Different Types of Empirical Evidence
I will now present several cases of what the empirical evidence for utility might be. Each case represents an idealized limiting case, positing a body of evidence that is richer than what we realistically expect to find empirically. This is not harmful for the present argument. If there are underdetermination problems even in a utopia of unrealistically rich empirical evidence, then, a fortiori, these problems will occur in more realistic circumstances of sparse evidence. Whether any of the discussed types of evidence are really evidence for utility is a philosophical question this paper cannot resolve.
14 The formal conditions stated in table 4 will be discussed more 14 As indicated above, interpreting a body of empirical observations as evidence for utility requires certain auxiliary assumptions about how utility surfaces in observable ways. Amongst these auxiliary assumptions are relatively common ones such as the assumption (mentioned above) that, if u i (x)>u i (y), then person i would, under normal circumstances, choose x over y, as well as more contestable ones such as condition (N1 a/b/c) introduced below. Whether or not commonly made such assumptions are defensible is left open here. These open questions, however, reinforce rather than weaken the central point of the paper, namely that attributing utilities to people on the basis of informally below. The argument can be informally followed even if the technical details of table 4 are skipped.
Ranking Evidence -Options (RankEv).
The evidence includes all true statements of the form -xR i y, where x, y∈X, i∈N and xR i y means "person i weakly prefers x to y" 15 , satisfying (P1) ("ordering") for each i∈N, R i is a reflexive, transitive and complete binary relation.
A binary lottery is an option of the form p*x+(1-p)*y, where x, y∈X, p∈ [0, 1] . p*x+(1-p)*y means "with probability p, get x; with probability 1-p, get y". Given a set of options X, let L(X) be the set of all binary lotteries in X. Note that X⊆L(X), since each x∈X can be interpreted as a binary lottery 1*x+0*y∈L(X) (where y≠x). For each i∈N, R i induces a strong ordering P i , defined as follows: xP i y if and only if xR i y and not yR i x.
Ranking Evidence -Options and Binary Lotteries (RankEvLot).
The evidence includes all true statements of the form -xR i y, where x, y∈L(X), i∈N and xR i y means "person i weakly prefers x to y", satisfying (P1) ("ordering") for each i∈N, R i is a reflexive, transitive and complete binary relation on L(X); (P2) ("Archimedean property") for each i∈N and all x, y, z∈X, if xP i y and yP i z, then there exist λ, µ∈(0,1) such that (λ*x+(1-λ)*z)P i y and yP i (µ*x+(1-µ)*z); (P3) ("independence") for each i∈N, all x, y, z∈X and all λ∈(0,1], xR i y if and only if (λ*x+(1-λ)*z)R i (λ*y+(1-λ)*z).
Additional Proxies for Utility -Case a (Prox-a).
The evidence includes all true statements of the form -f i (x) = λ, where x∈X, i∈N, λ∈R and f i : X → R is some real-valued observable proxy for person i's utility in response to options in X, satisfying (given that we also have (RankEv)) (P4 a) ("consistency of f-response with preference") there exist a positive monotonic transformation φ : R → R and some profile of utility functions {u* i } i∈N representing {R i } i∈N (according to theorem 2 below) such that, for all i∈N and all x, y∈X, f i (x) = φ(u* i (x)).
Additional Proxies for Utility -Case b (Prox-b).
The evidence includes all true statements of the form -g i (x, y) = λ, where x, y∈X, i∈N, λ∈R and g i : X 2 → R is some real-valued observable proxy for person i's utility in response to differences/switches between options in X, satisfying (given that we also have (RankEvLot)) (P4 b) ("consistency of g-response with preference") there exist a positive monotonic transformation ψ : R → R and some profile of utility functions {u* i } i∈N representing {R i } i∈N (according to theorem 3 below) such that, for all i∈N and all x, y∈X, g i (x, y) = ψ(u* i (x)-u* i (y)).
Additional Proxies for Utility -Case c (Prox-c).
The evidence includes all true statements of the form -h i (x) = δ, where x∈X, i∈N, δ∈{-1,0,1} and f i : X → R is some -1/0/1-valued observable proxy for person i's utility in response to options in X (taking values 1='positive utility', 0='zero utility', -1='negative utility'), satisfying (given that we also have (RankEv)) (P4 c) ("consistency of h-response with preference") there exists some profile of utility functions {u* i } i∈N representing {R i } i∈N (according to theorem 2 below) such that, for all i∈N and all x, y∈X, h i (x) = sign(u* i (x)). determine not only whether a person prefers an orange to a banana to an apple, but also whether, for any given probability p, the person prefers a guaranteed banana to a lottery whose prize would be either an orange or an apple with associated probabilities p and 1-p, respectively.
Case 3a:
We have (RankEv) and (Prox-a);
Case 3b: We have (RankEvLot) and (Prox-b);
Case 3c: We have (RankEv) and (Prox-c):
("utopian best case scenarios") Each person's utility surfaces in the form of the revealed preference ordering R i (over the options -and, in case 3b, binary lotteries -in X) and some other (see Waldner, 1972) , assuming that a greater such spontaneity corresponds to a greater utility gain. Or they could measure something else that might be thought of as a proxy for a person's utility. I am here making no claims as to whether such additional observable proxies for utility exist. The point is only to identify the logical implications of such a utopian best case scenario for the problem of interpersonal comparisons of utility.
16 At first sight, the proxy functions f i , g i and h i (particularly f i and g i ) may raise similar problems of measurability and uniqueness as the utility functions u i themselves. But even if there is no unique privileged scale for measuring f i and g i , we will assume that what makes f i and g i observable is that, whatever scale of measurement we choose, this scale is a common one for all persons in N. It is thus crucial that f i and g i are unique up to identical transformations (say positive affine ones) for every person. The proxies are to be interpreted, using Elster and Roemer's phrase (1991, introduction, p. 10) , as "objective proxies for subjective well-being", not as suggesting an "objective conception of well-being". 17 In case 3a, real-valued; in case 3c, -1/0/1-valued. 18 In case 3b, real-valued. 19 Also in case 3b.
Implications
To determine the implications of cases 1, 2 and 3a/b/c for the problem of interpersonal comparability, we will use two standard representation theorems. The argument can be informally followed even if the technical details of the theorems are skipped.
Theorem 2. (Debreu, 1954) For each i∈N, the following holds: Given that X is finite or Theorem 3 states that any preference ordering satisfying conditions (P1), (P2) and (P3) in table 4 can be represented by a utility function that is unique up to positive affine transformations. If we hold in addition that there is no independent fact of the matter about what the 'true' interpersonal comparisons of utility are, interpersonal comparisons of utility are indeterminate.
Using Only Ranking

Using Additional Proxies for Utility
The situation changes if we use the additional evidence (Prox-a), (Prox-b) (N1 a) ("interpersonal sameness of the conversion of utility into the proxy functions")
There exists a positive monotonic transformation φ : R → R such that, for all i∈N and all x, y∈X, f i (x) = φ(u i (x)).
(N1 b) ("interpersonal sameness of the conversion of utility into the proxy functions")
There exists a positive monotonic transformation ψ : R → R such that, for all i∈N and all
(N1 c) ("interpersonal sameness of the conversion of utility into the proxy functions")
For all i∈N and all x∈X, h i (x) = sign(u i (x)).
Conditions (N1 a/b/c) state that a profile of utility functions is adequate only if, according to that profile, all persons have identical transformations of utility into the observable proxies f i , g i or h i .
In cases 3a/b, conditions (N1 a/b) rule out the possibility that different persons exhibit identical f i or g i values and yet their underlying utilities are different. In case 3c, condition (N1 c) rules out the possibility that different persons exhibit identical h i values and yet they are not in the same one of the three states 'positive utility', 'zero utility', 'negative utility'. We will now see that cases 3a, 3b and 3c, jointly with conditions (N1 a), (N1 b), (N1 c), generate conditions (OLC), (CUC) and (ONC+0) in table 1, respectively.
Case 3a with (Prox-a).
If we accept condition (N1 a), we are no longer free to apply different positive monotonic transformations to the utility functions of different persons without undermining the adequacy of the resulting profile. Suppose we apply a positive monotonic transformation to one person's utility function, i.e. for some i∈N, we replace u i with θ(u i ), where θ : R → R is a positive monotonic transformation. Then we are also forced to replace φ with φ*, where φ is the transformation in (N1 a), defining φ* as follows: for all t∈R, φ*(t) = φ(θ
is the inverse transformation of θ). Consequently, we are forced to replace u i with θ(u i ) for every i∈N. Hence a profile of utility functions is determined uniquely up to identical positive monotonic transformations for every person. This is condition (OLC) in table 1, determining (LC)-statements.
Case 3b with (Prox-b).
If we accept condition (N1 b), the situation is similar. Suppose we apply a positive affine transformation to one person's utility function, i.e. for some i∈N, we replace u i with a i +bu i . Then we are also forced to replace ψ with ψ*, where ψ is the transformation in (N1 b), defining ψ* as follows: for all t∈R, ψ*(t) = ψ(t/b). On the second (pragmatic) view, which Davidson (1986) attributes to Harsanyi (1955) and Waldner (1972) of persons with similar preferences and expressive reactions we are fully entitled to assume that they derive the same utilities from similar situations." (Harsanyi, 1955, p. 279) We will return to this pragmatic view in section 7.2.
On the third (sceptical) view, instead of "not postulating any differences unless there is some reason to do so" (Waldner, 1972, p. 102) , it is held that "there is no scientific reason to postulate anything at all" (Davidson, 1986, p. 202) , and conditions (N1 a/b/c) are therefore rejected. 21 Or, in the case of h i , identical interpersonally significant states 'positive utility', 'zero utility' and 'negative utility'. 22 Or different interpersonally significant states 'pleasure', 'zero utility', 'pain'. 23 Or identical states 'pleasure', 'zero utility', 'pain'. Comparing tables 2 and 5, we observe that the conditions which are sufficient for the existence of 
Summary
Yet Another Impossibility Argument?
Schematically, the argument of the present paper can be summarized as follows:
Is there a fact of the matter about Are (N1 a/b/c) or some equivalent interpersonal comparisons of utility?
condition true?
Interpersonal Interpersonal comparisons of utility comparisons of utility are underdetermined are indeterminate. but not indeterminate.
Interpersonal comparisons of utility are determined (LC) (3a), (UC) (3b), (ZC) (3c).
Is there a fact of the matter about interpersonal comparisons of utility?
Interpersonal
Interpersonal comparisons of utility comparisons of utility are underdetermined are indeterminate. but not indeterminate.
Table 6
In short, unless we have the rich evidence of cases 3a, 3b or 3c (or, to be more precise, a sufficiently large subset of such evidence) and we accept at least one of the corresponding conditions (N1 a/b/c) (or some equivalent condition) as true, interpersonal comparisons of utility are underdetermined and, if we also believe that there is no independent fact of the matter about what the 'true' interpersonal comparisons of utility are, indeterminate. Is this yet another version of the argument that interpersonal comparisons of utility are impossible? Does the present argument once again make a mystery of the apparent ease with which we make (what look like) interpersonal comparisons of utility? I believe not. Underdetermination and even indeterminacy do not imply impossibility. As Quine stresses in the context of translation, there do exist adequate translation schemes. As soon as we select one such scheme, questions of interpersonal sameness of meaning have well-defined, though translation-scheme-dependent, answers. Quine's point is not that adequate translation is impossible. Rather, it is that no adequate translation scheme is determined uniquely by the available evidence. The underdetermination between alternative adequate translation schemes can be broken only by non-empirical considerations, such as conventions or considerations of parsimony. 24 In the case of the attribution of meanings to another speaker of my own language, for example, the homophonic translation scheme -which translates "Rabbit!" for the other English speaker into "Rabbit!" for me -, while empirically underdetermined, seems more parsimonious than the non-standard translation scheme which translates "Rabbit!" for the other English speaker into "Undetached rabbit part!" for me.
Similarly, to defend the possibility of interpersonal comparisons of utility, even on the view that such comparisons are indeterminate, we require an explanation of how the underdetermination between rival attributions of utilities to persons can be broken in a nonarbitrary way. I believe that the present account points towards at least two possible such explanations, independent from each other. The first one, assigning normative significance to certain states of affairs, is compatible even with the narrow evidence of cases 1 and 2 above. The second one, positing a fixed connection between certain empirically observable 'proxies' and utility, requires the richer evidence of cases 3a/b/c.
Assigning Normative Significance to Certain Options or States of Affairs
Given the weak evidence of cases 1 and 2, we cannot use constraints like (N1 a/b/c) for breaking the underdetermination between rival attributions of utilities to persons. But suppose that we identify some fixed options (or states of affairs) x 0 and/or y 0 in X as normatively significant. We might interpret these options, respectively, as 'deprivation' and 'saturation' consumption bundles of goods/resources (or as the state of consuming these bundles). And suppose further that we impose (some of) the following additional conditions on the attribution of utilities to persons: (Sen, 1970 (Sen, /1979 way, but nonetheless, by stipulation, in a normatively significant one.
Positing a fixed connection between empirically observable proxies and utility
The where, for each i∈N, x 0i and y 0i are the options in X identified as normatively significant for person i.
schemes, provided that we have no empirical reason to reject a homophonic translation scheme in favour of a non-standard one.
The argument for the possibility of interpersonal comparisons of utility, then, is the following. First, we use evidence as described by cases 3a/b/c and, second, so long as empirical adequacy permits, we accept conditions (N1 a/b/c) for breaking the underdetermination between rival attributions of utility to persons. As we have seen above, cases 3a, 3b or 3c, jointly with conditions (N1 a), (N1 b) or (N1 c), respectively, are sufficient not only for determining interpersonal comparisons of utility, but also for the existence of aggregation procedures satisfying Arrow's minimal conditions.
Concluding Remarks
We have seen that, even if interpersonal comparisons are not determined by the available evidence, the underdetermination can be broken non-arbitrarily (though not purely empirically) if (i) we assign normative significance to certain states of affairs or (ii) we posit a fixed connection between certain empirically observable 'proxies' and utility.
We can speculate whether the present account of the possibility of interpersonal comparisons of utility captures the actual mechanisms by which we make (what look like) interpersonal comparisons in everyday life. As suggested above, in everyday life, we may be inclined to attribute similar utility levels two different persons for similar options or similar states of affairs, so long as these persons are sufficiently similar. This is in essence an instance of (i). If we make interpersonal comparisons in this fashion, the underlying mechanism might be an informal instance of the account given in section 7.1. Alternatively, suppose that the evidence we actually use in attributing utilities to persons is richer than the sparse evidence of cases 1 and 2.
And suppose in particular that we do rely on (more informal versions of) the kinds of proxies described by cases 3a/b/c, attributing similar utilities for similar observable proxies. This is in essence an instance of (ii). If we make interpersonal comparisons in this fashion, the underlying mechanism might be an informal instance of the account given in section 7.2.
A psychological account of how we actually make (what look like) interpersonal comparisons of utility in everyday life is beyond the scope of this paper. Rather, the argument of this paper might be interpreted as an existence argument, showing that interpersonal comparisons of utility are not in principle impossible, and clarifying the logical structure that evidence and auxiliary assumptions must have in order to provide a basis for interpersonal comparisons of utility. Indeterminacy does not imply impossibility, and even if we hold that interpersonal comparisons of utility are indeterminate, we do not need to claim that such comparisons cannot in principle be made.
